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Commentary

Evaluating Federally Appointed Judges
in Canada: Analyzing the Controversy
TROY RIDDELL, LORI HAUSEGGER & MATTHEW HENNIGAR *
This commentary describes our experiences in trying to undertake a judicial performance
evaluation of federally appointed judges in Canada. Some respondents were enthusiastic
about the project, but others were strongly opposed to it and worried about the effects
that our survey would have on judicial independence. After describing the feedback that
we received and the fallout from our project, we examine the relationship between judicial
performance evaluation and judicial independence. We argue that a well-conceived judicial
performance evaluation does not violate judicial independence. We then explore the resistance to judicial performance evaluation in Canada, using a comparative lens. The explanation
for this opposition, it seems, lies partly in the broader socio-political context found in common
law jurisdictions with parliamentary systems of government and no judicial elections. In
our view, opposition to outside academic inquiry from strong elements within the Canadian
legal community also forms part of the answer.
Ce commentaire décrit la manière dont nous avons tenté d’entreprendre une évaluation du
rendement des juges nommés par le gouvernement fédéral Canadien. Certains répondants
se sont montrés enthousiastes quant à ce projet, alors que d’autres y s’y sont fortement
opposés en se disant soucieux des effets que notre sondage pourrait avoir sur l’indépendance
des juges. Après avoir décrit les commentaires que nous avons reçus ainsi que les répercussions de notre sondage, nous nous penchons sur la relation qui pourrait exister entre
l’évaluation du rendement des juges et leur indépendance. Nous faisons valoir qu’une évaluation
bien conçue du rendement des juges ne porte pas atteinte à leur indépendance. Nous
examinions ensuite la résistance à l’évaluation du rendement des juges au Canada à l’aide
d’un prisme comparatif. L’explication de cette réticence réside en partie, semble t il, dans
le contexte sociopolitique général des régimes parlementaires soumis à la common law où
les juges ne sont pas élus. Nous sommes d’avis que l’opposition à une enquête universitaire
externe de la part d’éléments vigoureux de la collectivité juridique canadienne fait également
partie de la réponse.
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“STUDY ASKING LAWYERS to critique judges sparks firestorm.”1 When we undertook

our research on judicial evaluation, this headline in Canada’s largest national
newspaper, the Globe and Mail, was not the response we had anticipated. We
had asked lawyers to evaluate, anonymously, the professionalism of federally
appointed judges for the purposes of measuring aggregate patterns in relation
to appointments made after the introduction of federal screening committees
in 1988. The strong reaction of a number of legal bodies and individuals and
the ensuing media coverage seriously undermined our ability to conduct the
research. But perhaps more importantly, our experiences have raised substantive
questions about the relationship between judicial evaluation, independence and
accountability, and the politics surrounding the judiciary. This commentary
explores two such questions: First, does undertaking judicial evaluations pose a
threat to judicial independence or to the administration of justice; and second,
why, when judicial evaluations are becoming more common in many parts of the
world, are they so strongly resisted in Canada?
As described in Part I, our initial attempt at implementing the evaluation
stage of our project took a subset of judicial appointments made from 1989–1997
and asked lawyers to evaluate judges before whom they had appeared on a series
of factors ranging from knowledge of the substantive law to the judge’s treatment
of the parties before the court. Our next attempt was designed to capture a wider
population. We asked law societies in each province to alert their members to our
study and to provide a link to an online survey. With both rounds of evaluation,
our goal was to get a snapshot of the quality of federal appointees to provincial
superior courts and to the Federal Court of Canada. We also wanted to test
whether appointees who had political connections prior to their appointments
1.

Kirk Makin, “Study asking lawyers to critique judges sparks firestorm”, The Globe and Mail
(4 March 2009) A8.
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were rated as highly as those without political connections. Previous research on
judicial appointments made by the federal government before 1988 suggested
that, on the aggregate, legal insiders tended to accord a lower legal reputation to
judges who had a significant political affiliation with the party in power.2 More
recent research suggests that the new screening committees introduced in 1988
for federal judicial appointments have reduced the number of appointees with
major political connections, though only modestly.3 The question of what this
has meant for judicial quality has yet to be successfully addressed.
Part I describes our attempt to address this question and the issues our
research raised. The project provoked strong responses, both favourable and
unfavourable. Some members of the legal community expressed a concern
about judicial evaluation and its effect on judicial independence. Others were
very supportive of the idea and discounted any impact on judicial independence.
To better understand these responses, we follow this first section with an analysis,
in Part II, of the relationship between judicial evaluation, judicial independence,
and the accountability of the judiciary. After arguing that a properly conducted
evaluation of the judiciary would not undermine judicial independence or the
administration of justice (and would perhaps even enhance the latter), the
commentary then explores, in Part III, why judicial evaluation is becoming more
common in many places while in others, particularly Canada, there is resistance
to the idea. The answer, in our view, lies partly in the broader socio-political
context found in common law jurisdictions with parliamentary systems of
government and no judicial elections. For example, in the United Kingdom,
though evaluation processes are common for lower court judicial officers, there
has been a reluctance to introduce them for the senior levels of the judiciary.4
There is nothing inherent in the parliamentary system that would preclude an
evaluation process that carefully accounts for issues of independence. However,
judicial elections in US states and the civil service model of the judiciary in the
civil law systems of continental Europe may encourage evaluation processes more
so than parliamentary systems, given that these two methods of judicial selection
2.

3.
4.

Peter Russell & Jacob Ziegel, “Federal Judicial Appointments: An Appraisal of the First
Mulroney Government’s Appointments and the New Judicial Advisory Committees”
(1991) 41:1 UTLJ 4. See also Lori Hausegger et al, “Exploring the Links between Party and
Appointment: Canadian Federal Judicial Appointments from 1989–2003” (2010) 43:3 Can
J Pol Sci 633 at 633.
Ibid at 634.
Stephen Colbran, “A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Performance Evaluation Programmes”
(2006) 4:1 J Commonwealth L & Legal Educ 35 at 58.
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more closely mirror the selection of other governmental actors, who receive feedback
on their job performance.
We believe that another part of the explanation is the opposition to judicial
evaluation by strong segments of the Canadian legal community. This opposition has
been influential enough to shut down attempts at evaluation, and it has not been
countered by other powerful forces such as the executive or legislative branches
of government, the media, or the public. The opposition to judicial evaluation
may be part of a broader resistance to academic inquiry into the legal and judicial
systems, driven perhaps by legal professionals’ self-interest or their overly-inflated
view of themselves as “guardians” of the legal system and community. After
exploring these possible explanations, we conclude with suggestions for future
lines of investigation into these issues.

I. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION PROJECT
A. BACKGROUND

In their study of federal judicial appointments from 1984–1988, Peter Russell
and Jacob Ziegel found that 24.1 per cent of appointees had “major” involvement
with the governing Progressive Conservative Party (as a party official, active
participant in an election or leadership campaign, or candidate for elected
office) and that 23.2 per cent had “minor” involvement (minor constituency
work, financial contributions, or close personal or professional associations with
party leaders).5 Interestingly, informants in each province tended to rate those
appointees with major political connections lower on average than those without
major connections.6
In response to criticism about the influence of patronage in the judicial
appointment process, the federal government introduced screening committees
in 1988 to vet judicial candidates.7 In their study of judicial appointments from
1989–2003, Lori Hausegger et al found that the screening committees had some
5.
6.
7.

Russell & Ziegel, supra note 2 at 22.
Ibid at 23-24.
These committees consist of members of the legal community; a member from the
judiciary; a representative of the province; lay people; and, since 2006, a representative of
the police. When the committee system was originally established, candidates were rated
as being either “qualified” or “not qualified.” In 1991, these categories were changed to
“highly recommended,” “recommended,” and “unable to recommend.” Additionally, at
that time, committees were also asked to attach a précis about the candidate. In 2006, the
Harper Conservative government revised the ranking system back to a two-tiered system
(“recommend” or “unable to recommend”).
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effect in decreasing the number of major political activists appointed by the federal
government. The study showed that 17.2 per cent of appointees had major political
connections and 23.6 per cent had minor political connections to the party in
power.8
Like Russell and Ziegel, Hausegger et al examined the quality of appointees
chosen for the bench in terms of the extent of their political affiliations. Respondents
were asked to rate the appointees before they became judges. The results, presented
in Table 1, below, show a trend similar to that found by Russell and Ziegel.
Respondents rated appointees with major past political activities, social
or professional connections as “outstanding” only 8.3 per cent of the time—
the lowest level of any category. Additionally, many more of these appointees
were rated as “poor” or “fair” relative to other categories of appointees. The “no
politics” category, a classification not captured in Russell and Ziegel’s study, is
perhaps the most instructive. While 32.1 per cent of these appointees were rated as
TABLE 1: QUALITY OF APPOINTMENT BY POLITICAL AFFILIATION 1989–2003
% of Each Political Affiliation Falling Within Each Rating Category
No Politics

Minor
Direct
Activities

Major Connections
and/or Major Direct
Activities

Major
Connections
Only

Major Connections
and Minor Direct
Activities

Outstanding

32.1%

15.8%

8.3%

13.3%

10.0%

Very Good

33.3%

22.6%

31.8%

24.4%

30.0%

Good

14.1%

12.4%

28.1%

28.9%

30.0%

Fair

0%

1.7%

12.0%

6.7%

10.0%

Poor

0%

0.6%

4.2%

2.2%

0%

SOURCE: From Hausegger et al 2010, reproduced with permission.

outstanding (more than twice as many as any other category), none of them was
rated as “poor” or even “fair.”9
Although these results are interesting, both studies are limited by the fact
that they do not capture the performance of the appointee as a judge, but only
the perceived quality of the appointment. Additionally, both studies are based on
a limited number of observations from informants who assisted the researchers
in determining political connections and who may or may not have personally
interacted with the appointees. A more comprehensive evaluation of federally
8.
9.

Hausegger et al, supra note 2 at 643.
They also divided the data to examine the quality of appointees by their appointing prime
minister. The differences between former prime ministers Mulroney and Chrétien were not
significant.
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appointed judges would have two primary benefits: First, it would allow for
an analysis of the relationship between political affiliation and quality of judicial
performance, rather than perceived quality of appointment (and could be
based on the assessment of a number of individuals who had appeared before the
judge); second, it would begin to provide an overall picture of the performance
of federally appointed judges who had been selected under the new appointment
system (using a sample size consistent with available time and resources). As discussed
in greater detail in Part II, we believe that such an exercise would benefit the
administration of justice in Canada.
B. ROUND ONE AND UNEXPECTED RESPONSES

We constructed questions using existing judicial performance evaluation (JPE)
surveys, particularly those conducted in US states such as Connecticut, Hawaii,
Maryland, Massachusetts, and Virginia, and a pilot project from Nova Scotia.
In addition to the standard questions about legal knowledge, communication
skills, fairness, and so on (categorized under the heading of “Evaluation”), we
included a separate section of the survey, labeled “Decision-making.” This category
contained questions about judicial decision-making tendencies such as whether
the judge tended to favour the Crown prosecutor or the accused in criminal
cases, “everything else being equal.”10 Although we intended the questions in
this section of the survey to be used for future research on judicial decision
making at the trial court level (a vastly understudied area, particularly in Canada)
rather than to address whether the judge was “biased,” some respondents may
have interpreted the questions as an assessment of whether judges were making
substantively “right” or “wrong” decisions. We sent the survey to lawyers who had
appeared before the judges in our sample.11
Neither judicial organizations nor law societies were asked to participate in
the first round of the study, nor were they forewarned that it would be conducted.
Although the imprimatur of these organizations and their resources (particularly
10. See the Appendix for the survey instrument.
11. The judges in our sample were appointed between 1989 and 1997. We chose this time frame
to allow for comparisons between appointments made by the Conservative government of
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (1988–1992) and the appointments made by the Liberal
government of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (1993–1997). We were going to compare our
results to a study of federal judicial appointments from 1984–1988, just before the new
federal appointment system was introduced; see Russell & Ziegel, supra note 2. Out of 532
federal appointees in this time frame, we found enough potential evaluators for 369 of them.
We found these potential evaluators by having research assistants comb through published
decisions in law reports.
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lists of contacts) could have made the research easier, we feared that partnering
with these groups might interfere with the independence of our inquiry. We did,
however, ask several people including lawyers, judges, and staff of one provincial
law society to give us feedback on the survey. None of them expressed reservations
about the research idea, so we were completely unprepared for the responses
we received.
Once the survey went out to potential evaluators, we began receiving feedback
almost immediately. Some respondents contacted us directly and others took
time to answer the general question about judicial evaluation that we placed at
the end of the survey instrument. While some respondents were enthusiastic
about the prospect of JPEs, particularly if they were to be used for judicial education
purposes that might result in changes on the bench, other responses were less
favourable. Some respondents expressed reservations about possible bias amongst
the evaluators, arguing that the survey provided an outlet for lawyers with “an
axe to grind.” One respondent argued that the evaluations would not necessarily
provide a true reflection of the quality of a judge since lawyers “like judges who
decide in their favour and are collegial with lawyers.” This may have been what
another evaluator was thinking when he suggested that the evaluation process “is
no better than having students evaluate professors.”
Some respondents also expressed concern about what we would do with
the data. While we had recognized the sensitivity of the information we were asking
lawyers to provide and strove to assure them of the confidential and secure treatment
that their replies would receive, we were obviously not explicit enough about
our plans for the data. Therefore, we modified the information provided to
respondents. We had originally told respondents that we planned to examine the
aggregate results, that we would not share the results with any organization, and
that our findings were intended for academic outlets. We changed this disclosure
to state more explicitly that this was an independent academic project, that we
would not share the results with any organization, and that we would not publish
individual judges’ results.12
Some respondents had questions about the funding source we listed—the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC)—and how closely
connected it was to the government of the day. One respondent felt very strongly
about this point, stating in an email to us,
12. Some respondents had expressed hope that we would release the individual results. One
respondent wrote, for example, “I hope you are doing it on every judge of the Court
appointed between 1989 and 2008 and that you publish the data with the applicable data
attached to which judge it relates to.”
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I assume that you are aware that SSHRC is an appendage of the Government of
Canada which can control the ideological bent of those deciding who ought to
receive grants. And many people know how to pick a researcher who will entirely
independently give you the result you want … . It is my view … that this survey
is an unwarranted and potentially damaging incursion into a fully independent
judiciary bought and paid for by the government of the day… .

After an email exchange, this respondent was largely satisfied with our explanation
that SSHRC was an independent government agency and that we would not be
releasing individual judges’ results to the government or any other organization.
However, this individual’s initial reply (and some other replies) alerted us to the
possibility that the political environment might be influencing reactions to our
project. Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper had criticized the judiciary
in the past, promising to appoint more “law and order” judges.13 This comment
angered many legal professionals and opposition politicians. Against this backdrop,
the fact that we were using federal research funds and were conducting an evaluation
of judges, which included questions on decision making in criminal cases, made
some respondents suspicious.
Even after we reassured respondents that we were conducting an independent
academic study and would not publish individual judges’ results, respondents
continued to express concern about the act of evaluating judges itself. One
respondent asserted that lawyers should never publicly comment on judges and
expressed real concern that “negative comments about judges (even through an
anonymous survey) might well have a negative impact on the view of the public
towards our judicial system.” Another respondent, referring to our project, stated
that “it’s inappropriate—stop doing it—judges cannot respond and surveys like
this affect judicial independence.” Some respondents inquired whether we had
received permission from the Canadian Judicial Council or the Office of the
Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs. Judicial independence was the most
common worry among those who opposed the project. Although the specific
threat to judicial independence was rarely stated, some respondents suggested
that the survey results could be used to put pressure on judges to decide cases in
a particular way or could cause them to attempt to be popular, rather than make
necessary but unpopular decisions.
Still, it is worth noting that we had many enthusiastic responses to the evaluation
process. One respondent merely wrote “it’s about time.” Others challenged the
concern about judicial independence, arguing that “the judiciary is the last Canadian
13. Clark Campbell, “PM says he’ll pick judges who are tough on crime”, The Globe and Mail
(15 February 2007) A1.
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institution that is devoid of effective accountability. Too often, reasonable steps
to address this are met with cries of the importance of judicial independence.”
One respondent suggested that, while he supported judicial independence and
“respected the difficult and often lonely job of being a judge … there is a difference between the independence of the bench and judges being immune from
constructive criticism.”
Although we recognized the sensitivity of the information we were seeking,
we were unprepared for the depth of feeling we stirred up. Beyond the emails from
potential evaluators, we also faced questions from outside parties who had heard
of the study. A chief judge in one province contacted us with concerns about
what we were doing. We were contacted by various law societies that had received
inquiries from their members about the propriety of participating. The Canadian
Forum on Civil Justice asked us for information after it received inquiries about
the project from lawyers and judges. The Office of the Commissioner for
Federal Judicial Affairs requested a copy of the survey instrument. Meanwhile, an
assistant deputy attorney general in Ontario reportedly “directed” Crown counsel
not to participate in the study.14 Shortly thereafter the justice reporter for the
Globe and Mail wrote a story about the study that further aroused the suspicions
noted above.15 The article referred to our project as a “federally funded” study
and prominently featured the questions on judicial decision making.16 After the
article was published, the Public Prosecution Service of Canada told its counsel
that it was not appropriate for them to participate17 and our funding source,
SSHRC, called to check in on our project. The SSHRC phone call spurred the
Research Ethics Board at one of our universities to re-examine our “use of human
subjects” application, which it had already approved, in order to ensure that we
were operating in accordance with the approval. In light of these events and the
likelihood of a skewed sample, we decided to shut down the survey and not to
14. Near the end of February 2009, we received a number of replies from Ontario Crowns
indicating that they had been told by their superiors not to participate. One respondent
specifically mentioned that “[t]he direction came from Mr. John Ayre, Assistant Deputy
Attorney General. He indicated that it is not the role of a Crown attorney to comment on
the judiciary.” This email was communicated on 27 February 2009.
15. The day after the story appeared in the Globe and Mail, the paper published a letter to the
editor about our project from law professor Jacob Ziegel, who is a prominent commentator
on judicial selection. Ziegel expressed support for the project so long as the names of
individual judges were not published—the headline for the letter was “Naming names a nono.” Globe and Mail (5 March 2009) A18.
16. Makin, supra note 1.
17. We received emails from prosecutors in the Public Prosecution Service indicating that they
had been told not to participate in the project.
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contact the hundreds of lawyers who had indicated they had experiences with
judges that they were willing to share. We suspected that only a vocal minority
had serious reservations with the project, but seeing that some individuals were
concerned about participating and others were forbidden to do so, we decided
that we needed to contemplate other approaches to get a more significant
response rate.
C. THE COLLECTION OF EVALUATIONS: ROUND TWO

Our limited response rate in Round One, coupled with the skewed sample that
resulted when Ontario Crown counsel and other lawyers were told not to
participate in our study, made it necessary to redo our efforts at evaluation. We
began the second round with an attempt to address the concerns expressed during
Round One. First, we deleted the separate section of the survey on judicial
decision making to avoid any inference that we wanted to track how individual
judges decided cases. Second, in order to reassure judges that we were conducting
an academic study, not launching an attack on the judiciary, we sent a letter to
the Canadian Judicial Council and the Commissioner for Federal Judicial
Affairs informing them of our project and providing them with assurances as to
our goals. In the letter, we made it clear that we were conducting independent
academic research, unaffiliated with any group or party. We also emphasized that
we would be reporting aggregate data, not releasing any individual judges’ results
(although we indicated that we would be willing to let judges see their own overall
average results for professional development purposes).
Finally, we took a different approach to recruiting evaluators. In an attempt
to be more inclusive, we sent letters to law societies in eight of the provinces
(leaving Quebec and New Brunswick for a later time when we could conduct
the survey in French). These letters sought to convince the law societies of the
importance of our research and to reassure them as to our goals and methodology.
Additionally, we asked the law societies if they would send an email to their
members alerting them to the study and including a link to our survey—or
at least making the link available on their website so that interested members
could participate.
We chose to recruit respondents through the law societies in the second
round with the goal of reaching a far greater number of lawyers and increasing
the response rate for our survey, which would, of course, help make our results
more robust. By allowing lawyers to self-select into the survey we also expected
to avoid one of the other hurdles that cropped up occasionally during the first
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round—respondents indicating that they did not have a good enough recollection
of the judge to provide a meaningful evaluation.18
Furthermore, we hoped that the law societies’ support would calm some of
the fears about the study. We recognized that seeking law society support might
have the disadvantage of appearing to tie us to these organizations, inviting questions
of what use the law societies might make of the data. In Round One, some
respondents raised this issue in the general question near the end of the survey
that asked whether law societies should be used to distribute the survey more
broadly. These respondents worried that the law societies would thereby gain
access to the data and that they “would not preserve the confidential nature of
the survey.” With this in mind, we carefully drafted an introduction to the survey
that reassured participants that we were independent academic researchers and
that we would not share the data with any organization.
Another concern we had with this second approach was that some lawyers
distrust their law societies. One of our earlier respondents suggested that law
societies have “too many biases and other motivations and agendas.” Another
argued that “law societies have been instruments of secrecy and blatant support
for the judiciary, no matter the abuses and incompetence. They are classic
examples of powerful monopolies that themselves, are not accountable to anyone,
least of all their members.” Thus, while involving law societies may confer some
legitimacy on the project in the eyes of some respondents (particularly those who
contacted their law society upon receiving our first survey to check the propriety
of answering it), we were aware that such involvement might also expose us to
other concerns and alienate some potential respondents.
D. RESPONSE

In the end, only two provincial law societies agreed to alert their members to
the study. When the law societies of other provinces did not respond after a
follow-up email, we then emailed the provincial affiliates of the Canadian Bar
Association (CBA). Most of these organizations did not respond to our requests
and, of those that did, none replied positively.
Although we did not receive much feedback from the provincial legal
organizations—and no response from either the Federal Commissioner for
Judicial Affairs or the Canadian Judicial Council—we did get a blistering letter
18. Of course, a difficulty with this approach is that there is no way to ensure that lawyers
evaluating a particular judge have actually appeared before that judge. However, we do ask
how many times they have appeared before the judge (in various forums such as trials or pretrial conferences).

414

(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

from the CBA itself. In that letter, the organization expressed concern that our
research risked “undermining public confidence in the Canadian judiciary and
the Rule of Law itself.” There was some confusion that we were attempting to
correlate the ratings of judges with which party they supported, thus threatening
judges’ freedom to support the political party of their choice.19 The CBA was also
concerned that we would be unable to get unbiased evaluators because fifty per
cent of those appearing before the judges—counsel for the losing parties—would
be “less than complimentary” to the judge involved in their case. Finally, the association expressed concern about the impact the release of our “dubious findings”
would have on the public’s respect for the judiciary. As one might expect from
these reactions, our second attempt at evaluation yielded very few responses.

II. THE ISSUES RAISED BY ATTEMPTS TO EVALUATE
JUDGES
Efforts at judicial performance evaluation have met with questions about the
research methodologies used, the fairness of the process, and whether the practice
violates judicial independence or provides an appropriate balance between
independence and accountability.20 Our experiences certainly demonstrated
people’s concerns about all of these issues and, in fact, highlighted another
contentious question: Does research into JPE undermine or improve the administration of justice or the rule of law?
In terms of research methods, the possibility of bias was raised by various
respondents and is a concern in relation to JPE studies more generally. We believe
that not all respondents will be influenced by their win/loss record, just as not all
students evaluate their professors according to the grade they received. Nevertheless,
steps must be taken to mitigate the possibility of biases distorting the results.

19. The CBA may have learned that, as part of our research, we wanted to assess whether a
judge’s degree of partisan affiliation prior to appointment (such as donating to a party or
running for office) was inversely correlated with their quality. However, even if this was the
case, the CBA misconstrued the intent and the effects of our research.
20. Theodore C Koebel, “The Problem of Bias in Judicial Evaluation Surveys” (1983) 67:5
Judicature 224; Kevin M Esterling & Kathleen M Sampson, Judicial Retention Evaluation
Programs in Four States: A Report with Recommendations (Chicago: American Judicature
Society, 1998); Rebecca Wood & Sylvia R Lazos, “Reflections in Response to the Nevada
Judicial Evaluation Pilot Project” (University of Nevada Research Paper 10–36, 2009),
online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1650764>; Jean E Dubofsky, “Judicial Performance
Review: A Balance Between Judicial Independence and Public Accountability” (2007) 34:1
Fordham Urb LJ 315.
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These steps include making the survey accessible to different types of lawyers and
achieving as large a sample size as possible for each judge, given time and resource
constraints. There are also methods to reduce the impact of outlying responses,
such as eliminating the highest and lowest scores for a judge and using median,
rather than average, scores.
Questions about how we would disseminate our results straddled concerns
about our research methods and concerns for judicial independence and the
administration of justice. As indicated above, there were fears that if we published
individual judges’ results, the judges would not have the opportunity to respond,
they might feel pressure to decide cases in a certain way, and the administration
of justice might be compromised by negative judicial reviews. Conversely, some
encouraged us to publish individual results. Still others hoped that the results
would be given to a judge’s administrative superior to improve the quality of the
justice system but would not be disseminated publicly.
We did not believe that publishing the individual results would violate
judicial independence because security of tenure, financial security, and administrative independence would still buttress a judge’s ability to make impartial
decisions. Indeed, in surveys of state judges in the United States, only a minority
of respondents believed that the JPE process—complete with the publication
of individual results—undermines judicial independence.21 As we began the
process, therefore, we debated the possibility of publishing individual judges’
results.22 We decided against it because we were concerned that it might not be
fair to publish results for some but not all federally appointed judges.23 Furthermore,
publishing individual results was not necessary to address our two research goals:
(1) assessing whether the inverse relationship found by Russell and Ziegel and
Hausegger et al between the “legal reputation” of appointees and their partisan
affiliation with the party in power still held true while using a more rigorous
methodological approach;24 and (2) analyzing the quality of appointments made
21. David C Brody, “The Use of Judicial Performance Evaluations to Enhance Accountability,
Judicial Independence, and Public Trust” (2008) 86 Denv UL Rev 115 at 143; Kevin M
Esterling & Kathleen M Sampson, Judicial Retention Evaluation Programs in Four States: A
Report with Recommendations: Executive Summary (Chicago: American Judicature Society,
1998) at 5.
22. We had no intention, though, of giving the results directly to administrative judges as some
respondents had hoped. However, we were willing to share a judge’s overall result with him
or her upon request, for professional development purposes.
23. Recall that to make the study manageable, we were only evaluating judges appointed between
1989 and 1997. Additionally, for a number of these judges, we could not find enough
potential evaluators to keep them in the sample.
24. Also, though we were using a more rigorous methodology than the one used by Russell
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under the new appointment system, which was promoted as a way to improve
the selection process and reduce the influence of patronage through the use of
screening committees. As the unexpected controversy intensified, we changed the
survey’s introduction to make it much more explicit that we would not publish
individual judges’ results, nor would we give them to any organization.25
Having this more explicit wording in the second round of surveys, in addition
to dropping the section on decision making, likely helped reduce the degree of
opposition that we faced. Also, inviting lawyers to participate through their
respective law societies in the second round, rather than simply sending out emails to
individual lawyers, increased the chances that respondents would be favourably
inclined toward the evaluation process. Nevertheless, uptake by lawyers was not
as strong as we would have liked. And, in addition to the refusals of most official
organizations to assist us with our survey, we still faced opposition to the project,
as exemplified by the CBA’s letter to us.
The varied reactions to the project, from vociferous opposition to enthusiastic
support, led us to undertake a systematic examination of the relationship between
JPE, judicial independence, and accountability. This analysis is presented in the
next section of the commentary.
A. INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE

In its 1985 Valente decision, the Supreme Court of Canada outlined three requirements of judicial independence that would allow judges to decide cases
impartially: job security, financial security, and administrative control over functions
related to the performance of the judiciary.26 Although subsequent court decisions
have clarified or expanded these foundational concepts27 and McCormick has
noted some additional preconditions of judicial independence in the AngloAmerican context,28 the Valente criteria remain fundamentally unchanged.

25.

26.
27.
28.

and Ziegel to evaluate appointees from 1980–1984, we were not certain about how
many responses we would need for each judge in order to feel confident about publishing
individual results.
The Globe and Mail article covering our project picked up on our debate about whether to
publish individual results, but did not highlight our final decision. This had the unfortunate
result of implying that we were still considering publishing individual results. Makin, supra
note 1.
Valente v The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 673 at paras 27, 40, 47, 24 DLR (4th) 161.
Provincial Judges Assn (Manitoba) v Manitoba (Minister of Justice), [1997] 3 SCR 3 at paras
118-24, 150 DLR (4th) 577.
See Peter J McCormick, “New Questions about an Old Concept: The Supreme Court of
Canada’s Judicial Independence Decisions” (2004) 37:4 Can J Pol Sci 839. McCormick
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Existing in “natural tension” with judicial independence is the desire to keep
justices accountable.29 The questions of how judges should be held accountable,
and to whom, have implications for JPE and are the subject of a range of perspectives.
On the question of to whom judges should be accountable, possibilities range
from the legal profession (particularly the judiciary itself ), to litigants, to the
broader public and the public’s elected representatives.30 Possible mechanisms for
judicial accountability can vary from indirect—such as norms regarding the
judicial role and societal attitudes—to direct—such as appellate review, disciplinary
hearings, administrative incentives and disincentives and, in the United States,
retention elections. Where JPE is placed along these continua will depend on the
types of questions asked, who conducts the JPE, how it is conducted, how widely
the results are distributed, and what kinds of consequences, if any, will result
from the evaluation.
JPE projects initiated by the political branches of government—especially
ones that include indicators of substantive decision making and have potential
consequences for particular decisions—would pose the greatest threat to judicial
independence. For example, proposals in the 1990s by some provincial Progressive
Conservative Party backbenchers in Ontario would have imposed JPE measures
on provincial court judges (including their sentencing practices in criminal cases),
would have authorized evaluation of decisions in particular cases, and would have
allowed a legislative standing committee to recommend to the attorney general
a judge’s removal from office on the basis of a JPE report. Not surprisingly, these
proposals failed in the face of concerns over judicial independence.31
Conversely, some arguments that JPE is unnecessary and undesirable appear
to be based on an unduly limited notion of accountability. This notion suggests
that review by appellate courts and disciplinary proceedings by the Canadian
Judicial Council (CJC) are adequate—and indeed the only legitimate—channels
for oversight of judges. However, it should be noted that the CJC’s oversight is

noted two additional implied elements of judicial independence from the British tradition:
judges are drawn from an aggressively independent legal profession and the use of formalism
(ibid at 841-42). He goes on to discuss the “novel” elements that have subsequently been
added by recent Canadian judicial decisions, such as the requirement of having a judicial
salary commission (ibid at 847).
29. M L Friedland, A Place Apart: Judicial Independence and Accountability in Canada (Ottawa:
Canada Communication Group, 1995) at 2.
30. Stephen B Burbank, “Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability and Interbranch
Relations” (2007) 95:4 Geo LJ 909 at 912.
31. See Derek Matisz, “Appointment of s.92 Judges in Canada” (MA major research paper,
University of Guelph, 2005) [unpublished].
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narrowly focused on investigating complaints concerning serious accusations of
judicial misbehaviour. Likewise, the capacity for appellate review to correct errors
in the lower courts is quite limited. Not only are most cases never appealed, but
many judges on the highest appellate courts see their primary role as jurisprudential
development rather than error correction and are more likely to deny leave to
appeal if the sole basis for appeal is to correct an error.32 Moreover, review by
appellate courts is a much more limited form of evaluation than that envisioned
by proponents of JPE. Appellate review and CJC oversight are not designed to
assess, on an ongoing basis, a variety of important qualities such as a judge’s legal
knowledge, demeanor towards parties and staff, communication skills, timeliness
of decision making, and fairness. Mechanisms for feedback and accountability
become even more important because of the long tenure that federally appointed
judges enjoy.33
The Ontario backbenchers and those arguing against any form of JPE
represent the extremes of the continuum. Indeed, most respondents in both
rounds of our study and the participants in the pilot project in Nova Scotia in the
mid-1990s were favourably disposed towards JPE in the context of professional
development or as an academic study of the judiciary and did not view evaluation
as a threat to judicial independence. Dale H. Poel reports that most of the Nova
Scotia court judges who (voluntarily) participated in the JPE pilot project did not
think that the evaluation process threatened judicial independence. He notes,
however, that the project was carefully advertised as a method of promoting
“judicial self-improvement” in order to avoid such concerns (and only the judge
and a voluntary mentor saw the results). A vast majority (over ninety per cent)
of the lawyers who took part in the Nova Scotia project, according to Poel, did
not believe that the assessment infringed on judicial independence but instead
favoured the periodic use of evaluation questionnaires.34
The lawyers who responded to our survey in Round Two were almost unanimously supportive of our approach to JPE, in which the aggregate results of the
survey would be used in academic publications and the individual results would
be given to judges upon request for professional development purposes but not
otherwise disclosed outside the research team. The majority of respondents in
32. See Brian A Crane & Henry S Brown, Supreme Court of Canada Practice 2000 (Toronto:
Carswell, 1999) at 26; Ian Greene et al, Final Appeal: Decision-Making in Canadian Courts of
Appeal (Toronto: Lorimer, 1998) at 106-10.
33. Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M Singer, “A Performance Evaluation Program for the
Federal Judiciary” (2008) 86:1 Denv UL Rev 7 at 22.
34. Dale H Poel, “What do lawyers think about judicial evaluation? Responses to the Nova
Scotia Judicial Development Project” (2005) 10:2 Innov J: Pub Sec Innov J 10 at 8-9.
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Round One were supportive of JPE by lawyers and other stakeholders as well,
though a significant minority expressed concerns about judicial independence.
Some respondents specifically stated that they would be in favour of JPE only if
it were used for professional development.35
In both rounds, some respondents suggested that judges needed to be evaluated
and that the results should be made known to their administrative superiors.
Others went farther and argued that the individual results ought to be made
public. Whether a wider distribution of the data, with possible consequences
such as more training mandated by an administrative judge or general public
displeasure, violates judicial independence depends on whether the JPE instrument
is neutral in terms of judicial decision making. This issue, in turn, raises the
question of what is considered neutral. A critical requirement of neutrality is that
questions must only be asked about the process of judging (from legal knowledge
to communication skills to fairness of treatment), not about the substance of
decisions. Although it is possible that a particular respondent’s evaluation of a
judge on matters such as fairness or the ability to apply the law to the facts may
be coloured by a specific decision, or even by the judge’s general decision-making
tendencies, surveying multiple respondents should dilute the effects of any
consideration of substantive decision making on the survey results. Rebecca Love
Kourlis and Jordan M. Singer argue that a system of JPE that focuses on process
can actually enhance the ability of judges to make unpopular decisions because
such decisions are placed in the larger context of whether the judge is considered
to be a good listener, fair, knowledgeable, and free from bias.36
Some commentators, however, argue that even process-oriented questions
can interfere with how judges ultimately perform their judicial function. Justice
Gregory Geason, an Australian judge, argues against judicial evaluation on the
ground that anything that constrains a judge beyond precedent or statute violates
judicial independence.37 By way of example, he asks whether a judge who
interrupted the parties frequently to identify key issues and reduce irrelevancies
might suffer on an evaluation compared to a judge who placed more emphasis
on letting the parties be heard. This is not a concern to be dismissed lightly, but
it should be noted that Justice Geason acknowledges the general importance of

35. As noted above, some of these responses may be attributable to the inclusion of questions
about judicial decision making in the survey instrument (though they were not intended as
part of the evaluation aspect of the survey) and from us not repeatedly emphasizing clearly
enough that we only intended to publish aggregate results.
36. Kourlis & Singer, supra note 33 at 21.
37. Gregory Geason, “A flawed proposal for judges,” Lawyers Weekly (19 October 2007) 20.
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judges acting with diligence, intelligence, and courtesy.38 Judges with different
styles could still score well on any indicator—a judge who interrupts parties, for
example, could do so with appropriate respect. Moreover, the existence of multiple
indicators means that a judge’s overall evaluation is not determined by any one
characteristic. Also, surveying multiple respondents would help to reduce the
possibility of systematic biases being introduced into the results, an outcome
that could directly or indirectly influence judicial independence. In principle,
we do not believe that a wider release of results from a process-oriented JPE
would impinge upon job security, financial security, or administrative control
over functions related to the performance of the judiciary, the three key elements
of judicial independence identified earlier in Part II.
Would our conclusion be different depending on who conducted the JPE?
Stephen Colbran, for instance, argues that any JPE project conducted by the executive branch of government would violate judicial independence.39 Lord Taylor,
the former British Lord Chief Justice, argues that any formal appraisal system
for the judiciary would also threaten judges’ independence from one another.40
Neither position necessarily offers a compelling logic if the JPE is conducted
appropriately (for example, by not evaluating the substantive outcomes of
decisions). However, optics are important to the administration of justice—even
the appearance of governmental interference with judicial independence needs
to be avoided. As a result, if JPE is to be used for more than just professional
development, where only the evaluated judges would see their own results, then
it might not appear appropriate for a state actor (the executive or possibly even
administrative judges) to administer the JPE system.41 A transparent JPE committee
system with representation of various stakeholders, which may include the
Office for Federal Judicial Affairs, members of the judiciary, law societies, and the
public, would be more compatible with the concept of judicial independence, at
least in appearance. This arrangement would be similar to some JPE committees
in the United States. It would also be analogous to existing structures in Canada
that deal with such issues as financial compensation and court administration.
By allowing multiple perspectives into the process, such a committee structure
would not only enhance the legitimacy of JPE but could also lead to tangibly
better JPE processes.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Ibid at 21.
Colbran, supra note 4 at 61.
Ibid at 57.
McCormick, supra note 28 at 847-49. This author notes that an emerging principle of
judicial independence has been independence from administrative judges.
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Of course, if a JPE committee system were established, policies would have
to be created to determine how results would be used. Reasonable people will
disagree about what these policies should be. A middle-ground approach might
be to release an annual public report containing the aggregate data (such as how
many judges were ranked from poor to excellent on each indicator) and to provide
the individual results to the judge and his or her administrative superiors. This
approach could be coupled with the potential for some modest yet direct consequences,
such as more training, based upon a judge’s results.
However, in the absence of a formal JPE system, we believe that it is appropriate
and important for other actors, such as academics and the media, to conduct this
kind of research on the judiciary. As we explained in our response to the CBA:
The data may very well show that most of the judges evaluated are very highly regarded.
If the data show otherwise or suggest that there is some room for improvement in
certain aspects of the judicial role, then perhaps steps could be taken to address such
issues and further strengthen the judiciary. We see our research as enhancing rather
than threatening the rule of law (and the administration of justice).

Given that many other countries in the world have introduced systems for JPE,
what might explain the resistance to the concept in Canada? That question is
explored in the following section.

III. EXPANSION OF JPE IN MANY PLACES, WHY NOT
CANADA?
Our call for the introduction of JPE in Canada, at both the federal and provincial
levels, needs to be placed in the context of the growing interest in evaluating
courts and individual judges around the world. Reasons for this interest include
frustration over a lack of timely access to justice; the growing policy importance
of courts, particularly through their application of constitutional and legislative
rights documents; and the rise of the “new public management,” which aims
to make government bodies more efficient and responsive to “clients.”42 These
factors are at work in Canada as well, as evidenced by evaluations of court
management in some provinces, such as Ontario’s Justice on Target project.43 So
42. European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEJEP), Monitoring and Evaluation of
Court Systems: A Comparative Study (Council of Europe, 2008); Pim Albers, “Assessment of
Court Quality: Hype or Not” (2009) 1:1 Hague J Rule of L 53.
43. The Justice on Target project publishes statistical information about criminal case processing
times in Ontario courthouses as part of a larger effort to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the criminal courts in Ontario. See Justice on Target, online: Ontario Ministry
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what explains the resistance to the idea of evaluating individual judges, and even
to a JPE study conducted by academics?
Part of the answer may lie in the broader socio-political context. In civil law
countries where entry to and advancement in the judiciary somewhat parallels
the process of the civil service, even if evaluations are conducted largely by judges,
the concept of JPE may be less foreign. In the United States, institutional drivers
not present in Canada, namely judicial elections, contribute to the acceptance
of JPE. The political values that undergird retention elections (skepticism about
government authority and support for institutional checks and balances) help to
explain the relatively higher demand for judicial accountability and the use of
JPE in the United States. The political culture in Canada, traditionally
considered more deferential to authority than that in the United States,44 provides
a less welcome context for JPE by emphasizing independence over accountability.
The reluctance to adopt JPE in countries like Canada, Britain, and
Australia, compared to its acceptance elsewhere, suggests that broader cultural
and institutional forces, both legal and political, can help to explain the decision
whether to adopt JPE. However, this is not a complete explanation. Pilot JPE
programs in Canada and Australia, the evaluation of lower courts in the United
Kingdom, and various British commissions’ calls for more systematic evaluation
of judges all suggest that JPE is not completely foreign to the British parliamentary
tradition.45 As we argued in Part II, there are ways of implementing JPE in a
parliamentary system that would balance independence with accountability and
professional development. Moreover, the differences in the timing and substance
of JPEs within civil law systems and in the United States (some states do not have
JPE, nor is there a JPE system for federal judges) indicate that more micro-level
factors, such as group politics, are involved as well. In Canada, legal elites appear
resistant to the concept of JPE. The major bodies representing lawyers and judges
in Canada may not necessarily always be opposed to reform,46 but they do seem
reluctant to embrace change, particularly if it is proposed by those outside the
legal community.47 These organizations see themselves as guardians of the legal
of the Attorney General <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/jot/default.asp>.
44. See e.g. Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United
States and Canada (New York: Routledge, 1990).
45. Colbran, supra note 4 at 56. Colbran notes that both the 1992 report by the Committee on
the Judiciary (for England and Wales) and the 1993 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice
(Runciman Report) recommended having more formal appraisal systems for judges.
46. For example, see the CBA’s call for changes to the federal judicial appointment process.
Canada, Canadian Bar Association, Federal Judicial Appointment Process, (Ottawa: 2005).
47. However, even changes from within the legal community can generate a negative reaction.

RIDDELL, HAUSEGGER & HENNIGAR, FEDERALLY APPOINTED JUDGES 423

profession. As noted above, some of their members argued that our survey was
ill-advised because it could produce negative findings that, in turn, would
undermine the administration of justice. While we gratefully acknowledge the
help that a couple of law societies provided, our overall experience with this project
seems congruent with some respondents’ sentiments that lawyers’ associations in
Canada tend to be powerful and resistant to greater transparency.
Beyond specific objections to JPE, it is possible that respondents’ reactions
are part of the Canadian legal establishment’s broader suspicion towards
academic inquiry into the judicial system.48 Forty years ago, for example, Sidney
Peck was criticized for studying the individual voting patterns of Supreme Court
of Canada judges.49 More recently, in 2009, the Executive Legal Officer of the
Supreme Court of Canada issued a directive to all former law clerks of the
Court not to participate in a survey sent to them by professor David Weiden—
a directive some clerks considered overly broad and counter to the goal of helping
Canadians better understand how an important public institution operates.50 In
2012, the chief justice of the Ontario Court of Justice sent a memo to judges
asking that they not participate in a confidential survey about criminal case
processing times prepared by a Ph.D. student in Political Science at the University
of Guelph. The Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario also refused to allow
Crown lawyers and court administrators to participate in that study.
This is not to say that there has never been cooperation from the legal
establishment in an academic study of the judiciary. Appellate court judges,
for instance, participated in surveys and interviews for Ian Greene’s frequently
referenced book Final Appeal: Decision-making in Canada’s Courts of Appeal.51
Additionally, Emmett Macfarlane’s book about the Supreme Court of Canada,
Governing from the Bench, is based on interviews with current and former justices,
former law clerks, and staff.52 However, these examples seem to be exceptions

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Provincial law societies unsuccessfully lobbied Canadian Lawyer magazine not to publish
an article in its May 1989 edition that listed the best and worst judges in Canada. This
evaluation was based primarily on surveys filled out by lawyers. Nora Underwood, “Rating
the Judiciary: A magazine’s gradings cause controversy,” Maclean’s (22 May 1989) 56.
We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for the idea to place our experiences into a
broader context and for supplying the Peck and Weiden examples.
S R Peck, “The Supreme Court of Canada, 1958–1966: A Search for Policy through
Scalogram Analysis” (1967) 45 Can Bar Rev 666.
Cristin Schmitz, “Supremely secret: top court wants law clerks muzzled,” The Lawyers Weekly
(26 June 2009), online: <http://www.lawyersweekly.ca>.
Greene, supra note 32 at 212.
Emmett Macfarlane, Governing from the Bench: The Supreme Court of Canada and the Judicial
Role (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012).
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rather than the norm. It would be interesting to address systematically how easy
(or difficult) it is for researchers to gain access to actors in the judicial system in
Canada as compared to other countries.

IV. CONCLUSION
Our experiences have made us more acutely aware of the political dimensions
surrounding JPE. We think that more research is needed to explain why JPE is or
is not used in different jurisdictions, either alone or as part of a larger system of
court evaluation. What role do macro-level factors (such as culture, institutions,
and the transmission of ideas between jurisdictions) as well as more micro-level
factors (such as leadership and group politics) play in whether JPE is adopted
and, if adopted, in what form?
More research also needs to be conducted on the central question that motivated
our foray into JPE in the first place—what are the linkages between judicial
selection systems and the quality of judges appointed? Somewhat surprisingly,
this question has attracted relatively little attention. For instance, while JPE has
been viewed in the United States as a potentially important tool in bolstering
merit-based appointment systems, it has not been used to determine systematically
whether such systems lead to the selection of higher-quality judges compared
to systems of direct appointment or direct election. Indeed, although research
has been conducted on such questions as whether judges appointed in different
systems decide cases differently,53 scant research has been done on whether certain
systems of appointment actually produce better judges.54 Assessing the quality
of judges appointed by the federal government under the screening committee
system would provide a point of comparison for other selection systems, such as the
nomination committee system used in Ontario, or even the systems of judicial
elections found in the US states.
Our experiences have led us to think more carefully about conducting such
research as academics. After two rounds adopting different approaches to evaluation,
we have been stymied by the objections of legal organizations in Canada. However,
we still believe the project is important. A systematic examination of the quality of
judges appointed under the current process provides valuable information on the
process itself. Debates over judicial appointments should be informed by empirical
53. Malia Reddick, “Merit Selection: A Review of the Social Scientific Literature” (2002) 106:4
Dick L Rev 729.
54. For exceptions see Damon M Cann, “Beyond Accountability and Independence: Judicial
Selection and State Court Performance” (2007) 90:5 Judicature 226; Brody, supra note 21.
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data rather than anecdotes spun out in the media. We hope that our research may
spur discussion within official circles and the informed public about JPE.
Finally, we hope that, by highlighting our experiences, this commentary may
lead to a dialogue within the legal community and between the legal establishment
and academics about the potential value of scholarly study of the judiciary. We
believe that carefully designed academic studies of the judiciary would give the
general public, as well as legal and political elites, a better understanding of the
judicial branch in Canada. Presently, perceptions of the judicial process in Canada
may be unduly influenced by anecdotal media stories in the absence of more
rigorous and systematic study.
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APPENDIX: THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT
Evaluation
Please rank the judge on each of the following items for which you are familiar:
Poor
Knowledge of substantive law
Ability to apply law to facts of the
case
Knowledge and application of the
laws of evidence and procedure
Written decisions and orders are
clearly communicated
Oral decisions and orders are clearly
communicated
Treats parties equally and with
respect regardless of gender, ethnic
origin, religion, age, disability,
sexual orientation or socioeconomic
status
Demonstrates a basic sense of fairness and justice, including careful
consideration of all the arguments
presented
Makes decisions without regard for
the potential for public criticism
Issues opinions and orders in a
timely fashion
Temperament and behaviour (attentiveness, treatment of court staff,
acts with dignity)
Effectiveness in formal settlement
conferences
Effectiveness in pre-trial (or prehearing) conferences (to clarify and
narrow issues)
Court management (punctual, prepared, docket management, control
over proceedings)
What is your overall evaluation of
this judge?
General Comments about the judge’s
strengths and weaknesses (optional)

Fair

Good

Very
Good

Excellent

Not familiar
enough to answer/
no answer
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Decision-making
[Note: this section of the survey was removed prior to the second round]
As part of our research we are also interested in obtaining your impression of the
judge’s decision-making patterns, if any. Everything else being equal, how is this
judge likely to decide?
Criminal Law

More prone to support
the accused (motions,
finding of guilt, sentencing
recommendations and
so on)

No discernible
pattern

Less prone to support
the accused (motions,
finding of guilt, sentencing
recommendations and
so on)

Personal Injury

More prone to support
plaintiffs (motions,
decisions, assessment of
damages)

No discernible
pattern

Less sympathetic to
plaintiffs (motions,
decisions, assessment of
damages)

Family Law

More prone to support
the female

No discernible
pattern

Less prone to support
the female

Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (legal rights—sections
7-14)

More prone to support
the rights claimant

No discernible
pattern

Less prone to support
the rights claimant

Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms (fundamental
freedoms, equality rights,
language rights—sections 2, 15,
and 16-23)

More prone to support
the rights claimant

No discernible
pattern

Less prone to support
the rights claimant

General Comments about
the judge’s decision-making.
(Optional).

